This paper provides evidence from cross-regional comparisons that the Russian mortality crisis (mortality rate increased from 1.0% to 1.6% in 1989-94 and stayed at a level of 1.4-1.6% thereafter) was caused mostly by stress factors (increased unemployment, labor turnover, migration, divorces, income inequalities), and by the increase in unnatural deaths (murders, suicides, accidents), but not so much by the increase in alcohol consumption (even though it also increased due to the same stress factors). Health infrastructure of a region had a positive impact on life expectancy only in regions with high income inequalities (large share of highest income group).
Introduction
This paper is an attempt to use the new evidence for the analysis of the Russian mortality crisis of the 1990s (mortality rate increased from 1.0% to 1.6% in 1989-94 and stayed at a level of 1.4-1.6% thereafter). It appears that the peak of mortality was reached in 2003-05, and that it started to subside afterwards ( fig. 1 ), so we now have the full dataset to analyze the dramatic upsurge in mortality rate from the beginning to the end. It is argued that the dramatic increase in mortality in the first half of the 1990s was only weakly associated with the deterioration of the health care system, and was due mostly to stress factors (caused by increased labor turnover, migration, divorces, income inequalities), and increase in unnatural deaths (murders, suicides, accidents), but not so much to the increase in alcohol consumption during the transition. Cross-regional differences in the health care facilities (number of doctors, nurses, hospital beds, etc.) did not have much of an impact on life expectancy. After the collapse of the free health care system that existed in the Soviet Union, legal and illegal user fees became common in the 1990s and beyond, so the poor part of the population could not take advantage of the health care facilities anyway. To be more precise, health infrastructure of a region had a positive impact on life expectancy only in regions with high income inequalities (large share of highest income group).
Overview of the literature
Transition to the market economy and democracy in the 1990s in Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union countries caused a dramatic increase in mortality, shortened life expectancy, led to the depopulation. The steep upsurge in mortality and the decline in life expectancy in Russia were the biggest ever recorded anywhere in peacetime and in the absence of catastrophes, such as wars, plague or famine. Mortality rate increased by 60%, from 1.0% to 1.6%, whereas life expectancy went down from 70 in 1987 to 64 in 1994 ( fig. 1 ). In fact, mortality increased to the levels never observed in the 1950s-1980s, i.e. for the period of at least 40 years. One has to go as far back as 1940 to find the mortality rates higher than in [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] (the data for the 1941-49 period -second world war and the postwar reconstruction -are absent). It should be mentioned that output fell by 45% in 1989-98 and that other social indicators, such as crime rate, murder rate, suicide rate, income inequalities deteriorated sharply as well.
The increase in mortality in Russia consisted of two periods: initial mortality hike with a peak in 1994 with subsequent decline, and later increase of mortality after 1998 financial crisis until 2003 (see fig.1 ). The mortality rise after the August 1998 crisis (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) still needs to be explained. Output was growing since 1999 and unemployment rate was on the decline, so at least one of the stress factors was not contributing to new mortality upsurge.
However, the sharp decline in real incomes that occurred after the August 1998 crisis could have become a major stress factor itself, even though its direct impact (via deterioration of nutrition) on mortality could have been limited. Besides, income inequalities, labor turnover and migration indicators, divorce rate did not show any signs of decline after the 1998 crisis and before 2002-03. After 2002-03 not only unemployment continued to decline, but also divorce rate started to fall. 1950  1953  1956  1959  1962  1965  1968  1971  1974  1977  1980  1983  1986  1989  1992  1995  1998  2001  2004 It is also noteworthy that there was no increase in mortality during the 2008-09 recession, although the reduction of output and real incomes was significant -over 10% from peak to trough on a monthly basis, and unemployment rate increased from 5.4% in May 2008 to 9.4% in February 2009. Perhaps, in recent two decades of transition people have already adjusted to stress (and those that failed to adjust died out), so economic downturns are no longer associated with the increase in mortality.
Hence, there is even more reason to consider the 1990-2003 fall in life expectancy as the exceptional development. The unique part of the transition story that does not have analogues in other countries was associated with the comprehensive market-type reforms -these reforms added another shock to the shock of democratization. Deregulation of prices and ensued changes in relative prices led to the mass reallocation of capital and labor that contributed greatly to stress factors -increased unemployment, migration, labor turnover, divorces, and income inequalities. However, the general rule here was that countries with stronger institutions, either democratic (like EE), or authoritarian (like China and Vietnam) managed to cope with the stress factors better than the others. Besides, only authoritarian regimes (China is the number one example) managed to choose and implement the strategy of gradual transition, that allowed to stretch the required restructuring -reallocation of capital and labor -over a considerable period of time and thus to mitigate stress associated with unemployment, migration, labor turnover (Popov, 2007) .
As a rule, countries which proceeded with more gradual reforms (from China to Uzbekistan and Belarus) managed also to preserve institutional capacity and to avoid completely or at least mitigate the collapse of output and the increase in mortality (Popov, 2000; Popov, 2007) . China and Vietnam did not have any transformational recession during transition and life expectancy in these countries was growing constantly (although in China -very slowly, as compared to the previous period and to other countries with similar levels of GDP per capita and life expectancy -see Lu, 2006) . Besides, in countries with strong institutions, there is at least one case (Cuba), where the reduction of output (about 40% in 1989-94) did not translate into a mortality crisis life expectancy in Cuba increased from 75 years in the late 1980s to 78 years in 2007.
The increase in mortality in post-communist countries is truly exceptional and unprecedented development that has only a few analogues in history. One is the transition from Paleolithic to Neolithic age about 7000 to 3000 B.C., when the life expectancy fell by several years (Galor and Moav, 2004) -possibly due to the change in diet and lifestyle (transition from hunting and gathering to horticulture and husbandry). Another comparable case -the increase in mortality during the Enclosure policy and Industrial Revolution in Britain, which is even better documented ( fig. 2) years for the whole population of a large country (Cornia, 2004) .
The dramatic increase in mortality that occurred during transition (most pronounced for middle aged men group and caused mostly by cardiovascular diseases) cannot be fully explained by "material" factors like the fall in real incomes leading to poor nutrition, deterioration in the quality of the environment and health care system, alcoholism and smoking (Shapiro, 1995; Leon, Chenet, Shkolnikov, Zakharov, Shapiro, Rakhmanova, Vassin, McKee, 1997) . It was pointed out that the change in the diet (from meat and milk products to bread and potatoes) cannot cause the increase of cardio-vascular diseases, that the emissions of pollutants actually decreased with the collapse of industrial output, and that the major impact of deterioration of health care, smoking and alcoholism (as well as changes in the diet) should result in increased mortality only with the lag of at least several years, that was evidently not the case (Cornia, 1997; Cornia, Paniccia, 2000) .
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The upsurge in mortality also cannot be explained by the "demographic echo" theory -the increase in mortality in 1989-94 was merely an echo of the decrease that occurred during Gorbachev anti-alcoholic campaign in 1985-87 (Avdeev, Blum, Zakharov, Andreev, 1998) .
The echo in this case seems to be several times larger than the initial shock. Source: Galor and Moav, 2004, citing Wrigley and Schofield, 1981. Whereas most experts would agree that the deterioration of the diet and degradation of the health care system, as well as increase in deaths from external causes (accidents, murders, suicides) contributed to the general increase in mortality in Russia and many other postcommunist countries, they mostly would not regard them as the primary factors. Today, it seems like there are two major competing theories -one states that the transition mortality crisis is generated by stress factors, another attributes the rise in mortality to alcohol consumption.
Stress factors are associated with the transition to the market economy and are given by the rise in unemployment, labor mobility, migration, divorces, and income inequalities (Cornia, 1997; Cornia, Paniccia, 2000) . King, Stuckler, and Hamm (2006) argued that mass privatization programs created psychological stress which directly resulted in higher mortality. The major theory that competes today with the stress-related explanation of the upsurge in mortality is the increase in alcoholism (Leon, Chenet, Shkolnikov, Zakharov, Shapiro, Rakhmanova, Vassin, McKee, 1997; Vishnevsky, Shkol'nykov, 1999; Pridemore, 2008) . The evidence from the comparison of Russia's regions allows shedding some additional light on the contribution of these factors to the increased mortality.
The most successfully performing regions, such as resource regions, demonstrated high elasticity of employment on output and relatively (as measured against the magnitude of the reduction of output) high unemployment rates (Popov, 2001a) . Such a pattern suggests that there was probably a tradeoff between performance and employment downsizing restructuring, and there was a price to pay for better performance in the form of higher relative increase in unemployment (per unit change in output) resulting from restructuring.
In absolute terms the levels of unemployment in the better performing regions are very close to national average despite the more favorable dynamics of output. Another "price of success" is the higher labor mobility and the growth of income inequalities. Gini coefficient of income distribution does not seem to depend on performance: regions with smaller declines in industrial output in the 1990s did not exhibit lower income inequalities. As a result, it turns out that relatively better off regions in terms of output change were relatively worse off in terms of stress factors leading to higher increases in mortality and greater reductions of life expectancy (Walberg, 1998) .
The major alternative explanation attributes the rise in mortality to the increased consumption of alcohol that really occurred in the early 1990s according to official data and even in the late 1980s, during the anti-alcoholic campaign, -according to unofficial estimates ( fig. 4 ). Deaths from alcoholic poisoning are often regarded as the better indicator of alcohol consumption (because part of the alcohol is produced illegally and smuggled). These deaths per 100,000 of inhabitants increased from 10 in 1990-91 to nearly 40 in 1994 and exceeded the number of deaths due to suicide and murders ( fig. 4) . Later, however, by 2007, the rate of these alcohol related deaths fell to the late Soviet levels, even though total mortality rate remained considerably above the late Soviet levels (figs. 1, 4). The increase in the intake of alcohol, in turn, is attributed to the decline in relative prices of spirits in the early 1990s. It was shown that the demand for alcohol, like the demand for other goods, is negatively affected by price and positively -by personal income (Andrienko, Nemtsov, 2006) .
Data and methods
The dependent variable is the change in life expectancy in 1990-2003 3 . The explanatory variables could be divided into three groups:
1. Objective conditions (climate proxied by average January temperature, degree of urbanization, population density, and Far East and Moscow dummy variables).
It would be interesting to analyze what are the factors affecting age-adjusted mortality at working ages (15-60 or 20-60 years) or life expectancy at working ages, but this data are not available in the regional breakdown. Instead I introduced another independent variable -share of population at working age in 1998 (in the middle of the period). It turned out to be insignificant in all specifications. Besides, an argument could be made that stress and alcoholism affects the elderly and children as well -elderly on obvious reasons, children -because in stressed families with high alcohol consumption children are exposed to greater health risks.
Economic variables (investment and incomes) and indicators of the institutional
capacity of the regional governments (crime murder levels increase and share of small enterprises in regional employment adjusted for the degree of urbanization). Murders, of course, affect mortality directly, but they are also good indicators of the institutional capacity of the state (monopoly on violence -see Popov, 2001a Popov, ,b, 2007 . The share of small enterprises in total employment characterizes the ability of the regional government to create a law and order business environment (Popov, 2001a,b) . This institutional capacity is needed to manage restructuring and associated stress.
3. Stress indicators -increase in labor mobility and unemployment, migration, divorces, income inequality and poverty.
4. Level of alcohol consumption and increase in this level.
5. Health care system deterioration proxie4d by the change in the number of doctors per capita.
6. Political orientation of the regional governments proxied by the percentage of votes received by the communists in the elections of the 1990s.
All indicators are taken from Goskomstat (Regiony Rossii), unless otherwise specified.
Goskomstat database contains data on 89 regions, but not all data for each region are available. AVTEMP, average temperature in January 1997, has a predictable negative effect on life expectancy change, suggesting that in cold regions due to the collapse of the infrastructure during transition it was more difficult to contain the rise in mortality. URB, the share of urban population on January 1, 1997, had a negative impact on life expectancy because economic restructuring was taking place mostly in urban areas. 
Results: initial conditions, economic restructuring, stress and alcohol consumption
Overall, initial and objective conditions (climate, urbanization, regional dummies for the Far East and Moscow), institutional capacity of the regional governments (share of employment at small enterprises, crime rate and murder rate), economic indices (investment and income), stress factors (labor turnover, migration, divorces, income inequalities, crime), and health care system developments (even without alcohol consumption indicators) explain over 80% of the regional variations in changes in life expectancy in 1990-2003 (table 1) . .007*** (7.03)
.006*** (-5.27) .006** Alcohol consumption. (Nemtsov, 2002) attributes as much as 1/3 of total deaths in Russia to alcohol related causes (including indirect), which is much higher than official estimates (less than 4% deaths from causes directly related to alcohol consumption), a view widely held by Western experts. "Despite the improving situation, one-third of all deaths in Russia are directly or indirectly related to alcohol, requiring intervention at a variety of levels" (Pridemore, 2008) . These are the highest available estimates that many experts question.
Official statistics reports that only 3% of all deaths are caused by alcohol (alcohol poisoning, liver cirrhosis, alcoholism, and alcoholic psychosis). Anatoly Vishnevsky (personal communications) attributes about 12% of all deaths to alcohol-related causes 5 .
It seems obvious that increased alcohol consumption contributed to the rise of deaths due to external causes -accidents, murders, suicides ( fig. 4) . In 2002 the death rates from external causes in Russia was not among the highest, but the highest in the world (table 2) . There is also an apparent correlation between alcohol consumption and death rate from all causes, but this does not necessarily imply causation. And third, the levels of per capita alcohol consumption, according to official statistics and alternative estimates, in the 1990s were equal or lower than in the early 1980s, whereas death rate from external causes doubled and total death rate increased by half (compare figs.
1 and 4). It appears, therefore, that we observe a simultaneous increase in variables (total death rate and death rate from external causes, as well as alcohol consumption) that are all driven by another factor, which is very likely stress. Cross regional comparisons give additional argument. There is a negative relationship ( fig.5 ) between the levels of vodka consumption and the level of life expectancy by regionhigh vodka consumption and low life expectancy in Northern and Eastern resource regions (with a lot of restructuring and a lot of stress) and low vodka consumption and high life expectancy in southern regions, especially in Northern Caucasus (with low levels of restructuring and less stress). Again, one possible explanation would be that higher alcohol consumption leads to higher mortality (lower life expectancy), but the other explanation is that higher stress has two effects -it reduces life expectancy and drives up alcohol consumption, which by itself does not contribute to higher mortality. If the residuals from the two equations above (explaining the level and increase in the sales of vodka) are introduced into the RHS of the best equation to explain changes in life expectancy, it turns out that these residuals have predicted (negative) sign and are statistically significant.
That is to say, there is still evidence that regional variations in the consumption of alcohol, even if they are not determined by stress factors, have a negative effect on life expectancy.
This impact, however, is rather modest -the coefficient linking life expectancy change in years and vodka sales per capita in decaliters is about 0.5, i.e. for life expectancy to fall by 1 year sales of vodka per capita have to increase by about 20 liters a year. Obviously, the size of the effect is too small to explain the decline in life expectancy by 5 years on average with average sales of vodka of 14-15 liters.
Deterioration of the health care system. The impact of health care system developments on life expectancy is rather weak and cannot be traced, if the indicators of the capacity of health care system (number of doctors, mid-level medical personnel, hospital beds, and policlinics patient capacity) are included into the RHS as a linear variables -this result is similar to (King, Stuckler, and Hamm, 2006 Besides, the impact of the health care system capacity on life expectancy change was extremely modest as compared to the impact of the stress factors that definitely predominated.
Concluding comments
To reiterate, Russian mortality crisis of the 1990s was caused by the shock-therapy type marketization of the economy that led to mass reallocation of labor in the course of industrial restructuring and to the dramatic rise of stress factors -income inequalities, unemployment, labor turnover, migration, crime, and divorces, that were mostly responsible for the unprecedented 60% increase in mortality rate. Alcohol consumption, although strongly correlated with the mortality rate, most likely was not the important cause of it, but was determined by the same stress factors, as the mortality rate itself. Deterioration of the health care facilities had only a modest impact on life expectancy and only in regions with low share of rich population and non-equitable political orientation (low share of votes casted for communists). Not a great record for 13 years, but at least no reduction in life expectancy that actually occurred. 
